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THE GOD WHO WILL BE : 
HERMENEUTICS AND THE GOD OF PROMISE 
Merold Westphal 
In The God Who May Be Richard Kearney proposes to replace an onto-theologi-
cal hermeneutics of religion with an eschatological hermeneutic. By onto-the-
ology he means, roughly, traditional philosophical theology revolving around 
abstract, metaphysical categories. He argues that the result is an insufficiently 
personal and ethical God and turns to eschatological categories for a remedy. 
I argue that the two types of category are not mutually exclusive, as he tends 
to present them, but that there is a legitimate place for abstract, metaphysical 
categories so long as they are contextualized in and subordinated to personal, 
eschatological categories. Kearney's eschatological God is one who neither is 
nor is not but may be. I argue that the very texts to which he appeals give more 
support to the notion of the God who will be, and that the reversal of actuality 
and possibility he calls for is unnecessary. 
In The God Who May Be/ Richard Kearney has given us a gift whose power 
to provoke thought is all out of proportion to its small size. Its opening sen-
tences read as follows: 
God neither is nor is not but may be. That is my thesis in this vol-
ume. What I mean by this is that God, who is traditionally thought of 
as act or actuality, might better be rethought as possibility. To this 
end I am proposing here a new hermeneutics of religion which 
explores and evaluates two rival ways of interpreting the divine - the 
eschatological and the onto-theological. (1) 
Before turning to the central thesis about "is" and "may be", about actu-
ality and possibility, I want to look at its corollary, the "new hermeneutics 
of religion." We can call this Kearney's methodological thesis if we notice 
1) that it is a substantive and not merely formal commitment and 2) that as 
such it belongs to the human theory being set forth and is not a kind of 
Prologue in Heaven, spoken sub specie aeternitatis from some neutral, trans-
human (non)point of view. In other words, the new hermeneutics we are 
to explore seeks to exempt from the hermeneutical circle neither the 
hermeneutical stance in general nor the particular commitments that make 
up this specific hermeneutic. 
The new hermeneutics revolves around the distinction between the 
eschatological and the onto-theolOgical. With Kearney I want to affirm the 
importance of the eschatological. I believe our God-talk should be at once 
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future oriented and metafuture oriented.2 Such eschatologically oriented 
God-talk should inform our epistemology, our ethics, and our spirituality. 
But that means it must inform our metaphysics as well. For if in faith we 
are to be a people of hope, God will have to be the God of hope (Rom. 
15:13).3 Moreover, 1 think that overcoming onto-theology is an important 
task for theology and the philosophy of religion, the disciplines that inform 
and critique our God-talk! So it would seem we are in the same ball park. 
But perhaps not on quite the same page, if I may mix my metaphors. 
Kearney has told me he suspects that I, the Protestant, will be more sympa-
thetic to Aquinas than he, the Catholic, and, as we shall see, he was right. 
But perhaps he did not suspect that I would be more Hegelian than he. It 
seems to me that Kearney treats the eschatological and the onto-theological 
too much as mutually exclusive. Over against his Kierkegaardian 
either / or I wish to suggest an Hegelian both/ and, which of course signi-
fies not addition but Aufhebung. Or, to revert to Kierkegaardian language, 
not either / or but teleological suspension. He hints himself at such a possi-
bility when he labels his position "onto-eschatology" (8), but he leaves this 
possibility undeveloped. 
Unlike so many who bandy the term' onto-theology' about without giv-
ing it any precise meaning, Kearney tells us quite clearly how he uses the 
term. In the first place, 'onto-theology' signifies "the old deity of meta-
physics and scholasticism" (2). The coin of the realm for this theology is 
the "abstract" categories of "pure being" such as ousia, hyperousia, esse, 
essentia, substantia, causa sui, ipsum esse, and actus pllnts (2, 23). Second, the 
use of these categories is motivated by a desire for a "plenitude of pres-
ence," the untrammeled vision that would be "absolute knowledge" (2, 
61). Third, the result is a "disembodied cause, devoid of dynamism and 
desire" (3), or, in other words, an impersonal God. Kearney's brief but 
splendid phenomenology of persona-prosopon "as eschaton not as telos (i.e., 
a fulfillable, predictable, foreseeable goa!)" (12) reflects his own desire (no 
pretense of disinterested reflection here) to preserve the biblical sense of a 
personal God, "an eschatological God who transfigures and desires" (9).' 
There is a distinct echo here of a Lutheran, Pascali an, Kierkegaardian, 
Heideggerian preference for the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob over the 
God of the philosophers. 
As a matter of fact, all three dimensions of onto-theology so far presented 
correspond to the account Heidegger gives in his own critique. Thus, 1) 
onto-theology revolves around such categories as ground, ratio, AOY0(" 
1TpcO'tll &PX~ causa prima, ultima ratio, and causa sui.6 2) For onto-theology, 
"the deity can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its own 
accord and by its own nature, requires and determines that and how the 
deity enters into it."7 God-talk is in the service of philosophy's project, which 
Heidegger articulates in terms of representational and calculative thinking.8 
Informally this project can be described as the desire to make the whole of 
reality intelligible to human understanding, a notion which can easily 
enough be developed in terms of sheer presence and of absolute knowledge." 
3) Heidegger joins Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard when he writes, 
"Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to [the god of philosophy]. Before the 
causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music 
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and dance before this god. The god-less thinking which must abandon the 
god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to the divine 
God. Here this means only: the god-less thinking is more open to Him 
than onto-theo-Iogic would like to admit."IO Heidegger notes that onto-the-
ology involves a certain marriage between Greek metaphysics and 
Christian theology, "whether for better or worse may be decided by the 
theologians on the basis of their experience of what is Christian, in ponder-
ing what is written in the First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the 
Corinthians ... 'Has not God let the wisdom of this world become foolish-
ness?'" After linking the "wisdom of this world" to what Aristotle calls 
first philosophy, Heidegger asks, "Will Christian theology one day resolve 
to take seriously the word of the apostle and thus also the conception of 
philosophy as foolishness?"ll 
Happily, at least from my own point of view, Kearney omits one aspect 
of Heidegger's account of onto-theology and replaces it with another. 
Heidegger derives the term from the fact that Aristotle's Metaphysics, 
which sets out to be an ontology, a theory of being qua being, ends up 
being theology, a theory of the highest being - thus onto-theology.12 This 
opens the door to his Seinsvergessenheit critique of onto-theology. By focus-
ing attention on the Highest Being it neglects to think Being, the primary 
task of philosophy as Heidegger understands it. This objection will carry 
force only with those who share this conception of philosophy, those 
whose religion is Heidegger's Seinsmystik or something very close to it. 
Since neither Kearney nor I are to be found among them, this issue is moot 
for the discussion between us. 
Following Marion rather than Heidegger, Kearney adds a fourth ele-
ment to his description of onto-theology. He notes that it involves granting 
"priority to being over the good" in our thought about GodY He finds an 
ethical significance in this insofar as the human correlate to this God is our 
own conatus essendi, which, as Spinoza and Levinas have shown us, yields 
at best a therapeutic ethic in which the self concentrates on itself and not an 
ethic of responsibility for others (19). This is why he contrasts "the eschato-
logical relation of one-for-the-other with the onto-theological relation of 
one-for-one, or if you prefer, of the one-for-itself-in-itself." (15). Although 
there is an "ethkal" dimension in Heidegger's account, insofar as he links 
onto-theology with Nietzsche's will to power or will to will and to its 
expression in modem technology, that is an "ethic" concerned with the 
relation of humankind to Being, not an ethic about my relation to my 
neighbor. It is the latter that Kearney wishes to retrieve. 
There is an intimate connection between his third and fourth points 
about onto-theology. An impersonal God involves at best an impersonal 
ethics. A God personal enough to worship will also be personal enough to 
give rise to a personal, or, if you prefer, interpersonal ethics. Invoking the 
language of patristic Trinitarian theology, Kearney points to "the promise 
of a perichoretic interplay of differing personas, meeting without fusing, 
communing without totalizing, discoursing without dissolving." (15). If his 
hermeneutics is to be called a "new or quaSi-phenomenology" it will be 
one "mobilized by ethics rather than eidetics" (16). He calls our attention 
to the etymology of prosopon, the Greek term rendered in Latin as persona. 
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The term is made up of the two parts: pros meaning 'in front of' or 
'toward'; and opos, as in optics, meaning a face or more particularly 
an eye, countenance, or vision. More precisely, prosopon refers to the 
face of the person as it faces us, revealing itself from within itself ... 
So to be a prosopon is to be-a-face-toward-a-face, to be proximate to 
the face of the other. And, tellingly, the term rarely appears in the 
singular but almost always as a plural noun ... signaling that the 
prosopon-persona can never really exist on its own (atomon), but 
emerges in ethical relation to others. In this sense, the prosopon may 
be said to be radically intersubjective, invariably bound up in some 
ethical vis-a.-vis or face-to-face. (18)14 
Heidegger's two paradigms of onto-theology are Aristotle and Hegel.Is 
Doubtless they fit Kearney's fourfold account as well as Heidegger's own. 
Their practice of the first two aspects results in the third and fourth, an 
impersonal deity who gives rise to no personal ethics, whether or duty or 
of virtue, that task being left to society.lt> The four elements in Kearney's 
definition sometimes come as a package deal. 
But not always. For there is no necessary link among them. In particu-
lar, there is no necessary link between the first and the second elements, 
which means that there is also no necessary link between the first and the 
third and fourth. The point can be put quite simply in terms of a distinction 
from some older systematic theologies between the metaphysical and 
moral attributes of God, or, as we might put it in the present context, 
between the impersonal and personal aspects of God. By themselves such 
categories as causa prima and causa SUi l7 don't give us more than "some 
spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless 
categories."ls But the God of the Bible is the creator of heaven and earth, 
and as such the first cause. Moreover, the notion of being self-caused 
could be interpreted as a way of expressing the biblical theme that every-
thing else is created, but God is not. This would place these "metaphysi-
cal" aspects of God in the context of a very personal God who is, in the 
context of biblical faith, at once worthy of worship and the ground of an 
ethics of personal (or interpersonal) responsibility. There would be no 
necessity of putting this kind of God-talk in the service of the desire for 
pure presence or absolute knowledge, nor need it take the form of repre-
sentational/ calculative knowing, which is in the service of the desire for 
power and control, both conceptual and practical. [9 
No doubt there is an either / or relation between onto-theology as a four-
fold package deal and the kind of God-talk Kearney and I desire to pre-
serve. But, I am arguing, there is no such relation between that kind of 
God-talk and the employment of abstract, metaphysical categories. God is 
more than causa prima and causa sui, to be sure, but not necessarily less. By 
being placed in the service of a particular philosophical project, the capture 
of reality without remainder within our conceptual nets, abstract, meta-
physical categories become the end, the telos of thought. God becomes 
nothing but what they articulate, and Kearney and I are in agreement that 
such a God is way too small. The Aujhebung or teleological suspension of 
which I spoke earlier means that instead of fleeing from this kind of God-
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talk as from the plague, we recontextualize it in the service of speaking bib-
lically about God. Whatever gets aufgehoben or teleologically suspended 
ceases to be a self-sufficient whole and becomes part of a whole of which it 
is not the first and organizing principle. Its telos is outside itself, which 
means, in this case, that the metaphysical discourse about God must be in 
the service of moral, personal discourse about God. 
Karl Barth is a good example of what I have in mind. If we allow our-
selves a slight anachronism, we can say that his theology opposes onto-the-
ology as the four-fold package deal on virtually every page, from The 
Epistle to the Romans through Church Dogmatics. His God, the God we know 
only through the free decision of divine grace to reveal Godself to us as 
Redeemer and Reconciler, is an intensely personal God.20 Moreover, he 
insists that theology and ethics are inseparable. "Ethics so-called I regard as 
the doctrine of God's command and do not consider it right to treat it oth-
erwise than as an integral part of dogmatics, or to produce a dogmatics 
which does not include it."2l By virtue of his view not only that theology 
rests entirely on God's self revelation but also that God remains paradoxi-
cally at once hidden and manifest in that revelation, he has no room what-
ever for any theology that would aspire to pure presence or absolute 
knowledge or a comprehension that has God at its disposal. 
This is the context for Barth's well known opposition to natural theolo-
gy. The appeal to a natural capacity for the knowledge of God and the 
corollary notion that philosophy can give this to us means that, at least for 
this branch of theology, our God-talk is in the service of philosophy's pro-
ject and must play by its rules.22 But this God is an idol and no God at all. 
So it is not surprising that in spite of his own theological realism,23 Barth 
does not accept Thomistic realism. 
What is surprising is that precisely in a critique of Thomistic realism and 
its appeal to natural theology, he not only insists on the realism of his own 
theology - "Indeed, if we are here presupposing revelation, won't we 
immediately have to add, how could God be anything other than real in the 
preeminent sense?" - but puts this in language Kearney would relegate to 
onto-theology - "As the preeminent reality God is causa prima, ens real iss i-
mum and actus purus, the reality of all reality."24 What keeps this from being 
a lapse into onto-theology is the context in which it occurs. Although Barth 
considers these to be legitimate ways of speaking about the God whose gra-
cious love is revealing, redemptive, and reconciling, they are at once inde-
pendent, not in the service of philosophy's ideal of autonomous and ade-
quate knowledge, and dependent, having their telos outside themselves in 
the God at whose deepest nature, love, they cannot even hint. 
And now comes a second surprise. Aquinas isn't an onto-theologian 
either. No doubt he would be if his natural theology were left to stand 
alone. But it most decidedly is not. In his Summa Theologiae, his natural the-
ology, establishing the existence and (abstract, metaphysical) nature of 
God (I, Q. 2-11) is sandwiched between two radically qualifying claims. It 
is doubly inadequate. First it is inadequate for salvation. There are truths 
necessary for salvation which are not accessible to "the philosophical disci-
plines investigated by human reason" but only to faith through "Scripture, 
inspired by God."(I, Q. I, A. 1). Unlike the sciences "which proceed from 
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principles known by the natural light of the intellect ... sacred doctrine 
accepts the principles revealed by God" (I, Q. 1, A. 2). Second, our knowl-
edge of God, whether by reason or revelation, philosophy or theology, is inad-
equate in another sense. We are not able in this life to have a vision of the 
divine essence, but only an indirect, analogical knowing based on our 
direct acquaintance with creahlres. So far from being a matter of sheer 
presence or absolute knowledge, our knowledge of God is not even true, 
strictly speaking, but only in a secondary, derivative way. For it does not 
meet the criterion of adequation between the intellect and its object. Even 
when, in rapture or in the life to come, we are enabled to see the essence of 
God, God remains incomprehensible. (I, Q. 12-13).25 
The first of these two inadequacies comes into clear focus if, like Thomas 
himself, we do not let the Five Ways stand alone as if they were the Alpha 
and Omega of his theology. If, instead of stopping after the first eleven 
questions of the First Part, we read the whole of the Summa Theologiae, a 
strikingly Hegelian pattern emerges?6 Just as in the Phenomenology of Spirit 
and the Science of Logic, the movement of thought is from the most abstract, 
least adequate (but nevertheless indispensable) forms to more concrete, 
richer, and ultimately more fundamental forms of experience or thought,"7 
so Aquinas' theology moves from the Prime Mover to the very (tri)personal 
God to whom one relates in terms of law and grace, faith, hope, and charity. 
Thomas Merton states the Thomistic position succinctly. "For although 
I can know something of God's existence and nature by my own reason, 
there is no human and rational way in which I can arrive at that contact, 
that possession of Him, which will be the discovery of Who He really is 
and of Who I am in Him."28 Barth is so eager to refute the first part of this 
claim, that he fails to give sufficient attention to the second, to notice how, 
in spite of their quarrel over natural theology, they end up as comrades in 
arms in the battle against onto-theology. 
Barth does not make this mistake in the case of Anselm. He complains 
that most commentators on his work "have completely failed to see that in 
this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not the key, to an 
understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me 
more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to theolo-
gy."29 How can Barth possibly say that about a theology that revolves 
around such abstract and (apparently) impersonal notions as "that than 
which a greater cannot be conceived" and "that which cannot be conceived 
not to exist"? For it is above all the Anselm of the ontological argument, 
not of Cur Deus Homo?3o that concerns Barth. The answer is quite simple. 
He recontextualizes not only these conceptual abstractions but the whole 
process of seeking understanding in the life of faith. Far from being an 
attempt of autonomous reason to make itself master of the whole of being, 
this desire for understanding has its origin in a faith informed by Scripture 
and the creeds to which it relates as servant, not as judge. Moreover, the 
entire exercise is addressed as a prayer to God, whose help is invoked in 
worshipful awe. The faith that seeks understanding with the help of 
abstract, metaphysical conceptualities, precedes that search and is a per-
sonal relation to a personal God. As belief it is "belief in" and never merely 
"belief that". Anselm never forgets and never lets his reader forget that the 
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search for understanding has its origin in praise and prayer and has these 
as its goal as well. This is not onto-theology. It looks like onto-theology at 
the first stage, but at the second, third, and fourth it reveals itself to be its 
antithesis. 
The moral of the story is quite simple. By decoupling the first element of 
onto-theology (abstract, "scholastic" categories) from the second element 
(the project of total intelligibility), Aquinas and Anselm, like Barth, keep it 
from having the third and fourth elements (an impersonal and sub-ethical 
God) as its consequences. In order to have a biblical, personal, eschatologi-
cal, ethical God, the goal Kearney and I share, it is necessary to overcome 
onto-theology. But this does not require that we abandon abstract and 
impersonal metaphysical categories in our God-talk, only that we put them 
in their proper, subordinate place. After all, you and I are material objects 
and organisms. While it would surely be dehumanizing to treat us as 
nothing but material objects and organisms, it is not necessary to denigrate 
the study of these dimensions of our being to affirm that we are first and 
foremost persons capable of responsibility and of love. It is only necessary 
to demote such reflection to its proper, subordinate place. 
********** 
I tum now to Kearney's central thesis. "God neither is nor is not but may 
be" (1). The "is" he associates with onto-theology, the "is not" with nega-
tive theology rather than with atheism, and the "may be" with the eschato-
logical God-talk he wishes to defend. This latter he sometimes speaks of as a 
"third channel"(8) or a "via tertia" (34). But he says little about negative the-
ology/l and in the Prologue from History he speaks of "two rival ways of 
interpreting the divine" (I, emphasis added), the onto-theological, which 
thinks of God as act or as actuality, and the eschatological, which thinks of 
God as possibility. It's the God who is versus the God who may be. 
As a hermeneutical phenomenologist, Kearney does not try to think God 
directly but through the mediation of texts; and the hermeneutical circle 
within which he operates is one committed to taking biblical texts serious-
ly.32 So it is no surprise that he directs our attention to the God who 
promises (2-4, 22, 25-28, 36-37).33 Of course, only a God who can perform 
speech acts can make promises/4 and this ties in very directly with 
Kearney's concern for a truly personal God. Essences and substances do 
not, as such, make promises. 
But when he speaks about the God who promises, the emphasis falls on 
the future orientation of promises. Our texts privilege a God who "possibi-
lizes our world from out of the future ... the God-who-may-be offers us the 
possibility of realizing a promised kingdom by opening ourselves to the 
transfiguring power of transcendence ... This capacity in each of us to 
receive and respond to the divine invitation I call persona ... [The God of 
promise is] the posse which calls us beyond the present toward a promised 
future" (1-3). I have added italics in the above citations in order to empha-
size the way in which the divine promise is about our future. In this con-
text, we get a clear meaning of what it is to oppose the tendency "to subor-
dinate the possible to the actual" (1). Such subordination would put us in 
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what Marcuse calls a "one-dimensional" world, one whose only dimension 
is the status quo." "Realists" know that the empirically observable way 
things are is the limit within which possibilities can be thought. But "for 
God all things are possible" (Matt. 19:26 = Mark 10:27; d. Luke 18:27). 
Neither the laws of nature as we discover them nor the laws of society as 
we devise them are ultimate. With God on the scene, there are possibilities 
undreamed of in those worlds. 
Without disputing such a reading, Kearney wishes to go beyond the 
physical and the social to the metaphysical in resisting the tendency "to 
subordinate the possible to the actual." He sees the biblical God as "posse 
(the possibility of being) rather than esse36 (the actuality of being as fait 
accompli)" (4). The title of his book is meant to express this central theme, 
which he formulates in various ways: "God can be only if we enable this to 
happen" (2). God is "someone who becomes with us, someone as dependent 
on us as we are on Him" (29-30). God says, III am who may be if you continue 
to keep my word and struggle for the coming of justice" (37-38). 
Such statements clearly take us beyond the horizon of the "for us" to the 
horizon of the "for God". Accordingly, we must add to them statements 
which otherwise might be given a weaker, "for us", interpretation. When 
we read that "the promise remains powerless until and unless we respond 
to it" (4), this is a statement about the being of God3? and not just about us. 
In a similar vein we must read the claims that "if we say no to the king-
dom, the kingdom will not come" (5) and "God commits Himself to a 
kingdom of justice if his faithful commit themselves to it too" (29). 
All this strikes me as a triple non sequitur. 1) From a logical point of 
view, it seems clear that there can be no promises without an actual 
promisor. The possibilities opened up by the promise have their ground, at 
least in part, in the actuality of the promisor, which of necessity precedes 
them insofar as they are not reduced to mere logical possibilities. The very 
logic of promising requires us lito subordinate the possible to the actual"(l) 
in this sense. Only an actual God can make promises. From the fact, 
affirmed in faith, that the possible exceeds the horizons of the actual as 
defined by the natural and social orders as we are familiar with them, it 
does not follow that it exceeds the horizon of the actuality of the God who 
promises. In its rather the very act of promising that opens up those exces-
sive possibilities and thus precedes them.3s 
2) There is a textual as well as a logical sense, as it seems to me, in which 
Kearney's conclusion does not follow from his premises. In the process of 
talking about the God of promise, he often speaks, both directly and by cita-
tion of the God who will be (3-4, 21, 25, 30). Surely the God of promise is the 
one who will be there IIfor us" in keeping with the promise. And it may well 
be, as we shall see, that we should think of God as having a future as well as 
ourselves. It is precisely in the middle of these God-who-will-be contexts 
that Kearney shifts to his may-be mode (3-4, 30). But it is entirely tmclear 
what the textual warrant, I am speaking here of Kearney's own text, for such 
a shift might be, what keeps it from being hermeneutically arbitrary. 
3) Kearney is likely to respond that the textual basis for his may-be talk 
is the covenantal character of the divine promises. He appeals to the 
covenant between God and Israel mediated by Moses, which clearly has a 
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conditional character. Here are the blessings that are yours if you obey; 
and here are the curses that are yours if you don't. But he fails to take 
account of the unconditional character of the covenant with Abraham39 and 
with David.40 Nor is the promise of a new covenant, made through 
Jeremiah conditiona1.41 Nor is the promise made to and through Peter, "I 
will build my church, and the gates of Hades will not prevail against it" 
(Matt. 16:18).42 None of these texts suggest that the God of the Bible is as 
dependent on us as we are on God. Taken as a whole the biblical text does 
not offer warrant for privileging the God who may be over the God who 
will be. Kearney's conclusion does not follow from the text he is interpret-
ing any more than from the text in which he presents his interpretation. 
Thinking here about human promises may be helpful at this point. 
Suppose I promise my son to take him to Barnes and Noble where his 
favorite superstar (athlete, pop singer, poet [?]) will be signing auto-
graphs. "Be sure to come home right after school. I'll come home early 
and we'll go right over, since (s)he will only be there from three to four 
0' clock." Let us assume that I make this promise in good faith. "I will be 
there and I will take you." In spite of this intention, my will-be might very 
well be a may-be in some obvious ways. I might get caught up in my work 
and simply forget. Or I might be in an accident on the way home and be 
both unable to be there and unable to let anyone know why. Happily, I 
see no evidence that Kearney seeks to warrant his move to may-be with 
the help of such contingencies in the case of divine promises. I may forget 
or be in an accident, but not God. 
There is, of course, another way in which my promise may remain 
unfulfilled. My son may not show up. He might get caught up in conver-
sation after school with his latest heart throb, and he may either forget our 
date or decide that walking her home is a better way to spend his time than 
standing in line for an autograph. But neither my actuality as promisor nor 
my actuality as promise keeper is compromised by his failure to show up. 
Kearney is clearly not working in a context where grace is irresistible or 
divine foreknowledge renders future contingencies certain. So, setting 
these possibilities aside for the sake of argument and focusing on the case 
where my son fails to show up, we have a genuine analogy to the relation 
between God and those to whom God makes conditional promises. 
Blessings promised can fail to become actual for us if and when we exclude 
ourselves by our own behavior; and this is true for God as well. Just as I 
may be the father who takes his son to the autograph party at Barnes and 
Noble only if he shows up after school, so God can be the Savior only of 
those willing to be saved (on God's terms). But this is no reason to convert 
will be into may be across the board or to invert the order of actuality and 
possibility. For, as we have just seen, the actuality of the one who makes 
and keeps his promises both precedes and is the condition of the possibili-
ty that what is promised will actually occur. 
Given his (one-sided, as it seems to me) emphasis on the conditionality 
of divine promises, Kearney asks whether he ends up with a conditional 
God. "No," he replies to his own question. "For if God's future being is 
indeed conditional on our actions in history, God's infinite love is not. As 
a gift, God is unconditional giving. Divinity is constantly waiting" (37). This 
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would seem to confirm the argument just given, namely that even if 
(bracketing irresistible grace) we can say that aspects of God's being, such 
as being my Savior, are what God may be, depending on my response to the 
promise and command of God, other aspects of God's being, including the 
love that is the condition for the possibility of this may be, are uncondition-
a1. God is love. If we are to express this in relation to time, we will have to 
speak of the God who will be there as promised, not the God who may be. 
In the background of Kearney's discussion is the question of how our 
God-talk should relate God to time. As Wolterstorff puts the relevant 
issue, "All Christian theologians agree that God is without beginning and 
without end. The vast majority have held, in addition, that God is eternal, 
existing outside of time. Only a small minority have contended that God is 
everlasting, existing within time.""" The classical definition of God's eternity 
is that of Boethius. "Eternity is the whole, perfect, and simultaneous pos-
session of endless life."44 This notion is closely intertwined with that of 
God as actus purus, and we have seen that Kearney relegates such a notion 
to "the old deity of metaphysics and scholasticism" (2). Clearly his sympa-
thies are with Wolterstorff, who promises to "take up the cudgels for that 
minority [who affirm everlastingness over eternity], arguing that God as 
conceived and presented by the biblical writers is a being whose own life 
and existence is tempora1."" So, for that matter, are mine. 
The question comes up especially in Kearney's discussion of the burning 
bush incident, in which the name of God is given to Moses as 'ehyeh 'asher 
'ehyeh/" translated into Greek as ego eimi 110 on, into Latin as ego sum qui sum, 
and variously into English as "I am he who is," "I AM THAT I AM," and "I 
AM WHO I AM" (Ex. 3:14).47 Over against these "onto-theological" transla-
tions, Kearney suggests that we should hear promise and the future tense in 
this name and favorably cites the following translations (25-27): "I shall be 
what I shall be" (Rashi), "I am as I shall show myself" (Gese/LaCocque), 
"As the one who will always be there, so shall I be present in every time" 
(Buber), and "I will be there as I will be there" (Rosenzweig). I am no 
Hebrew scholar, but I've been told that Hebrew is rather vague about tenses 
and leaves a good bit to contextual determination. My own view is 1) that 
the issue is properly to be decided on contextual and thus hermeneutical 
and theological rather than grammatical grounds, and 2) that the context 
favors such future tense renderings as Kearney cites.411 
The contextual cues are abundant. God's first self-identification to 
Moses at the burning bush is as "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, 
and the God of Jacob" (Ex. 3:6), that is, as the God of covenantal promise. 
Then, in response to Moses' "Why me, Lord? Why not send someone 
else?" God replies, "I have observed ... I have heard ... I know ... I have 
come down ... I will send you ... I will be with you" (Ex. 3:7-12). It is 
immediately after this that Moses asks for God's name and is given the 
crucial words whose translation we are discussing. Then God tells Moses 
to convey the following promise to the elders of his people, "I declare that I 
will bring you up out of the misery of Egypt, to ... a land flowing with 
milk and honey" (Ex. 3:17). To this he adds a further promise, "I will 
stretch out my hand and strike Egypt with all my wonders that I will per-
form in it ... I will bring this people into such favor with the Egyptians 
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that, when you go you will not go empty-handed" (Ex. 3:20-21). Much 
later, as Moses and his people are about to leave Sinai for the promised 
land, God reaffirms his promise. "My presence will go with you, and I will 
give you rest." Moses responds, "If your presence will not go, do not carry 
us up from here," to which God patiently replies, "I will do the very thing 
that you have asked" (Ex. 33:14-17). 
All these indicators point to a future tense reading of the name God 
gives to Moses and of the Tetragrammaton, YHWH, that is so intimately 
linked to it (Ex. 3:15). But they also point to speaking of the God who will 
be rather than the God who may be. The conditional character of the 
covenant at Sinai does not render God's actuality conditional. The subor-
dination of conditionality to unconditionality, and thus of possibility to 
actuality can be seen in this summary of the Sinai covenant: "I will be there 
for you. Whether I am there is blessing or in judgment is up to you. But 
one way or the other, I will be there. That is certain. You can count on me." 
One could, of course, read this future tense as only "for us" (who are 
"in" time) and not also "for God" (who is eternal). But let us suppose, as 
both Kearney and I are disposed to do, that Wolterstorff is right in suggest-
ing that we are more faithful to biblical texts if we speak of God as ever-
lasting (and thus temporal) rather than eternal (and thus "outside" of 
time). It will still be the case that the personal, promising God of the texts 
will more appropriately be described as the God who will be than as the 
God who may be. 
But what about traditional renderings of the name of Exodus 3:14 in the 
present rather than the future tense, those that restrict the future of God's 
promise to the "for us" and retain a pure (eternal) present "for God" who 
is conceived as actus purus? In the first part of this paper we saw that Karl 
Barth sees no conflict between such language and the language that por-
trays God as a fully personal lover whose future kingdom we await in 
hope. Among similar cases to which Kearney points us is Augustine. In 
his "quasi-Parmenidean" reading of Exodus 3:14 there is "no fundamental 
difference between [the biblical] ego sum qui sum and the esse of meta-
phYSics," or the latter's ipsum esse, or ousia, or substantia, or essentia. In each 
case we are dealing with "an a-temporal, immutable essence" (22-23). 
It would be foolish to deny the influence of Greek philosophy on the 
Christian theology of God as actus purus, immutable and eternal. At the 
same time we should not fail to note that many who speak of God this way 
have thought that they were thereby preserving something important 
about the biblical revelation of God, that this is, for example, one way of 
expressing the infinite, qualitative difference between God as Creator and 
the whole of the created world. Augustine would surely be surprised to 
hear his reading described as "quasi-Parmenidean". Like Aquinas, he is 
keenly aware of the limitation of purely philosophical insight, calling atten-
tion to what "I did not find" in the books of the Platonists, in particular the 
Incarnation and Atonement, making it necessary to turn from the 
Platonists to the apostle Pau1.49 Christian "confession" is thus to be con-
trasted with platonic "presumption" (VII, 20), namely the presumption 
that philosophical speculation is all we need. Accordingly, when we 
speak of God as "I am that I am," God is not, merely ipsum esse but the 
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very personal "voice from on high: 'I am the food of grown men.'" Or 
again" ... you cried out to me: 'I am that I am'" (VII, 10). The abstract 
metaphysics of being is Aufgehoben in the theology of the personal God 
who speaks.50 Similarly, God may well be That which Is" (VII, 17), but in 
the Word made flesh, wholly unknown to Parmenides and Plato, we know 
God as "Truth in person" (VII, 19). 
Another example of such a teleological suspension is found in 
Augustine's commentary on Psalm 9:10.51 
Let those who know your name hope in you, when they have ceased to 
hope in riches and in the other allurements of this world. When the 
soul which is being turned away from this world is looking for some-
where to place its hope, the knowledge of God's name welcomes it at 
exactly the right moment ... knowledge of that name exists only 
when he is known, whose name it is ... Scripture says, The Lord is his 
name Ger 33:2; Am 5:8).52 This means that whoever has willingly sub-
jected himself to God as a servant has come to know this name. And 
may those who know your name put their trust in you. The Lord said to 
Moses, I am who I am. Thus shall you say to the children of Israel, HE 
WHO IS has sent me (Ex. 3:14). Let those, therefore, who know your name 
put their trust in you, to avoid putting it in things which flow past in 
the swift flux of time, things that have no being other than 'will be' 
and 'has been.' What in them is future is instantly past as soon as it 
has come; it is anticipated with eagerness, and let go of with sorrow. 
But in God's nature there will not be anything which does not yet 
exist, or anything that was, which is not now; there is only that which 
is, and that is eternity itself. Therefore those who know the name of 
the one who said, I am who I am, and of whom it was said, The T AM 
has sent me, should stop hoping for and loving temporal things, and 
instead should devote themselves to the eternal hope.53 
Three things to note about this striking passage. First, it employs the 
traditional, "onto-theological" translation of Exodus 3:14 and speaks of 
God as actus purus and not merely as eternal but as "eternity itself." 
Second, the God who is the bearer of these metaphysical attributes is a per-
sonal God, to whom we relate as servants of a Lord and in whom we can 
rightly place our hope and trust. While the promises of God are not 
explicitly mentioned, they are the implicit presupposition of the notion 
that we can put our hope aI,d trust in this Lord. Finally, the purpose of the 
eternity talk is not give us an essence to gaze at, much less to have a first 
principle in terms of which we can achieve the goals of a certain philoso-
phy, pure presence or absolute knowledge. The purpose is rather ethical, 
instructing us where to look for the Good, the proper object of our desire. 
To be sure, this is the ethic of the First Commandment, You shall love the 
Lord your God, and not the Second, You shall love your neighbor as your-
self. But for Augustine as for Jesus, the First is never an alternative to the 
Second but always its indispensable presupposition. Only those who have 
learned not to put their hope and trust in the fleeting goods of this world 
will be free for the divine call to responsibility toward their neighbors. 
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We are miles away from Parmenides. 
Wolterstorff and Kearney might argue that there is an incoherence here, 
or at least that there is a poor fit between the Greek, philosophical and the 
Jewish, biblical dimensions of the God-talk of thinkers like Augustine, 
Anselm, and Aquinas. And they might well be right. God everlasting may 
fit the biblical accounts better than God eternal. But we should notice two 
things. First, the debate should not be between onto-theology as a fourfold 
package deal and the attempt to speak biblically about God as everlasting 
rather than eternal.. The big A's do not fit the first alternative and they 
become straw men when we treat them as if they do. The debate should be 
between those who abandon immutability and eternity for change and 
everlastingness and those who retain the former attributes but teleological-
ly suspend such metaphysical categories in the moral or personal attributes 
that give us a God of love, whose unchangingness is faithfulness to 
covenant promises. 
Second, when the debate is so framed, it will be seen that alternative A 
(for Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Aujhebung) cannot be eliminated a 
priori because, like onto-theology, it is willing to talk about God in abstract, 
metaphysical, "scholastic" terms. The Aujhebung needs to be recognized 
and evaluated, not ignored. 
There is, it seems to me, no shortage of serious philosophical and theo-
logical problems for each alternative. The debate between them strikes me 
as fully legitimate.54 Perhaps each side needs the other to remind it of the 
dangers to which it is prone. In any case, while indicating my own lean-
ings, I have not so much tried to resolve the debate as to keep open the 
space for it and to formulate it in such a way as to maximize its fruitfulness. 
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